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ABSTRACT
E-mail is probably the most popular application on the In-
ternet, with everyday business and personal communications
dependent on it. Spam or unsolicited e-mail has been esti-
mated to cost businesses significant amounts of money. How-
ever, our understanding of the network-level behavior of le-
gitimate e-mail traffic and how it differs from spam traffic
is limited. In this study, we have passively captured SMTP
packets from a 10 Gbit/s Internet backbone link to construct
a social network of e-mail users based on their exchanged e-
mails. The focus of this paper is on the graph metrics indicat-
ing various structural properties of e-mail networks and how
they evolve over time. This study also looks into the differ-
ences in the structural and temporal characteristics of spam
and non-spam networks. Our analysis on the collected data
allows us to show several differences between the behavior
of spam and legitimate e-mail traffic, which can help us to
understand the behavior of spammers and give us the knowl-
edge to statistically model spam traffic on the network-level
in order to complement current spam detection techniques.
1. INTRODUCTION
E-mail has an increasing role in human communica-
tions. In this paper, the social behavior and dynamics of
e-mail traffic are studied. First we have created social e-
mail networks based on SMTP traffic passively captured
on a 10 Gbits/s backbone link of Swedish University
network (SUNET).1 An e-mail network is a graph of e-
mail communications with user e-mail addresses as ver-
tices and e-mail transmissions between them as edges.
Then we have investigated the basic structural proper-
ties of these social networks by looking at the degree
distribution, average path length, clustering coefficient,
and strongly connected components for the constructed
e-mail networks. Although it was previously believed
that e-mail networks are scale-free [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], we
have shown that it is only valid for legitimate e-mail
transmissions. By studying the graph of e-mail com-
1http://vision.sunet.se
munications on the network-level, it can be seen that
e-mail networks are not scale-free due to the large quan-
tity of unsolicited traffic (also known as spam) on the
Internet. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
large scale study of social properties of e-mail networks.
Study of the topology and structure of complex net-
works such as the Internet andWorldWide Web, has at-
tracted a lot of attention in order to answer basic ques-
tions such as “What does the Internet look like?” Anal-
yses have shown that these social networks have funda-
mental structural differences from other types of net-
works such as random networks [7, 8]. Watts and Stro-
gatz [9] showed that social networks are “small world”
networks, which means that they are highly clustered
and have short characteristic path lengths. The www
graph [10, 11, 12], phone call graphs [13], online social
networks [14], and movie actors network [15] are a few
examples of such networks.
The unregulated growth of e-mail communications
leads to a huge and complex social network. Ebel et
al. [1] showed that e-mail networks, analogous to other
social networks, show the characteristics of small world
networks. They also showed that since the vertex con-
nectivity of e-mail networks follows a power-law dis-
tribution, these networks exhibit the characteristics of
scale-free networks as well [15]. The e-mail network
studied in [1] was limited to a small number of student
e-mail communications logged by the local mail server
at their University. Although it is impossible to create
complete global graph of e-mail communications, due to
its large and increasing size, but in this paper we have
studied significantly large e-mail networks that are not
restricted to a single domain.
E-mail networks can be studied as both directed and
undirected graphs. An undirected graph only repre-
sents the existence of a relationship between two e-mail
addresses and is independent of who the sender or re-
ceiver of the e-mail is. However, in directed graphs the
direction of the relationship is also taken into account.
Although current anti-spam tools are very efficient in
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hiding spam e-mails from users’ mailboxes, the problem
with unwanted traffic, waste of mail server resources,
and false positives (legitimate e-mails incorrectly fil-
tered as spam) caused by inaccurate filtering tools still
remains untackled. In order to improve the defense
against spam it is necessary to understand its behavior
and detect deterministic characteristics that are indica-
tive of spam traffic on network-level as close to source
of spam as possible.
To better understand the dynamics and behavior of
spam and to study the differences with legitimate e-
mail, we have constructed two distinctive e-mail net-
works from spam traffic and legitimate e-mail trans-
missions (also known as ham). The e-mails have been
classified as spam and ham by deploying a well-trained
spam filtering tool (SpamAssassin [16]). This provided
us a ground-truth and allowed us to study characteris-
tics of spam traffic and how it differs from ham. Since
many of the attempts to send spam get rejected by
the pre-filtering strategies deployed on receiving mail
servers (e.g., blacklisting, greylisting, DNS look-ups), a
third e-mail network was generated from both delivered
and rejected spam communications.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We have performed structural analysis on the e-
mail networks generated from large amounts of
network traffic in order to understand their struc-
tural characteristics.
• We have conducted a temporal analysis of e-mail
networks and studied the effect of selecting differ-
ent time windows on the structural properties that
we consider.
• We have found surprising results in our study that
although e-mail networks are considered scale-free
in the literature, this is not the case.
• We have analyzed and compared the structural
properties of legitimate e-mail (ham) networks and
spam networks.
• We have observed properties of e-mail traffic that
are indicative of spam. We believe these features
can potentially be used for creating new anti-spam
tools on the network-level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the background and related work in
the area. Section 3 describes the measurement settings
used for data collection and generation of e-mail net-
works. Section 4 describes various structural and tem-
poral properties of e-mail networks and how they differ
for spam and ham traffic. A discussion of our results is
presented in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes this
paper.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The problem of understanding the structure and prop-
erties of network systems such as the Internet [17], World
Wide Web [10, 11, 12], phone call graphs [13], e-mail
networks [1], interaction of users in mobile systems [18],
and online social networks [14], have strongly attracted
researchers. Studies of structural properties such as the
“small world phenomenon”, or scale-free behavior of
networks, etc., have revealed that social networks are
fundamentally different from other types of networks
[7].
Complementary, statistical analysis of e-mail traffic
in order to model the e-mail workload, or study of de-
terministic properties of spam and ham, have also been
of great interest during the last few years. Understand-
ing the distinguishing characteristics of spam traffic is
necessary for development of new mechanisms that can
keep up with its dynamic behavior.
Recent attempts to characterize and analyze e-mail
traffic have used different types of e-mail datasets such
as SMTP log files of mail servers [19], spam e-mails
captured in honeypots or relay sinkholes [20], flow-level
data collected by network gateway routers [21], and e-
mail traffic captured on the network-level [22].
The first study of the topology of e-mail networks
was presented in Ebel et al. [1]. They studied an e-
mail network generated from log files of the mail server
of their university (Kiel University) over a period of
112 days. The network contained 59,812 nodes with
average degree 2.28. They showed that this e-mail net-
work exhibits a scale-free degree distribution and has
small world properties. Our e-mail network is not lim-
ited to only one domain and is significantly larger (con-
tains 5, 971, 825 nodes and 10, 610, 875 edges), although
it was created over a shorter period of time.
Newman et al. [23] used an e-mail network that
was generated from e-mail address books stored in a
large University computer system, to study its struc-
ture and the potential of spreading computer viruses via
e-mail. The network we have studied here is different
from theirs, since our dataset comes from real e-mails
that were actually transmitted during the measurement
period and not from contact-lists/address books.
Caldarelli et al. [6] also studied e-mail networks in
order to measure the strength of the relations between
users, by keeping track of the number of e-mails that
were received from a given sender. They analyzed data
sets from five mailboxes containing e-mails from differ-
ent numbers of senders during 3, 5 and 10 years. They
showed that the degree distribution of all the e-mail net-
works are similar and follow a power-law distribution.
Use of social e-mail networks for distinguishing be-
tween spammers and legitimate e-mail senders was first
proposed by Boykin et al. in [5]. They generated an
e-mail graph from e-mail headers of one user’s mailbox.
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They showed that this network consists of several dis-
connected components and the spammers construct a
large connected component with a low clustering coeffi-
cient. This property was used to generate blacklists of
spammers and whitelists of legitimate users. Their ap-
proach is limited to individual users and does not scale
for the whole network.
Gomes et al. [2] generated two different types of
graphs from mail server log files of their University, and
found graph theoretical metrics that structurally and
dynamically differ for spam and ham e-mails. They
investigated properties such as the in- and out-degree
distribution, communication reciprocity, clustering co-
efficient, and the probability of visiting a node during a
random walk. In our paper we have also studied some of
these structural properties on our e-mail networks and
have compared our observations when applicable.
In [24] Kong et al. suggested to use topological prop-
erties of e-mail networks to generate more efficient dis-
tributed collaborative spam filters. They made use of
the very low percolation threshold caused by power-law
degree distribution in the e-mail network studied in [1]
to perform a percolation search and detect arrivals of
previously seen spam on the network.
Brendel et al. [25] used e-mail networks to generate
social relation pattern graphs for spammers and legit-
imate users. These pattern graphs were later used to
detect typical and abnormal patterns on an e-mail net-
work generated from mail server log files. Their algo-
rithm was only efficient in recognizing normal users, but
not adequate for detection of spammers.
In [26] Lam et al. extracted different structural fea-
tures from e-mail social networks, such as in- and out-
degree, communication reciprocity, and communication
interaction average, and deployed them in building a
learning-based spam detection method. Their e-mail
network was generated from the publicly released En-
ron e-mail dataset. They simulated spam senders and
injected spam e-mails into the dataset to study the ef-
fectiveness of their approach. A similar set of features
was studied in [27] by Tseng et al. to construct a com-
plete spam detection system based on an incremental
support vector machine model. The dataset used to
verify the efficiency of their system was also based on
log files of a local university mail server (National Tai-
wan University).
Table 1 summarizes the properties of the e-mail net-
works described here. All of the above studies have
taken place on relatively limited e-mail datasets. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first study
of social structure of e-mail networks on the Internet on
a large scale.
3. MEASUREMENT SETTINGS
In this section, the methodology and system settings
used to collect data and generate the e-mail networks
are described.
We have constructed an e-mail network from SMTP
packets captured on a backbone link of the Swedish Uni-
versity Network (SUNET) during a period of one week
in March 2010. More than 400 million SMTP packets
(filtered on port 25) were passively collected from a 10
Gbit/s link in both directions [28, 29], and were aggre-
gated into more than 24 million flows to allow retrieval
of complete e-mails. Around 12.5 million e-mails and
6.2 million mail server responses were extracted from
these flows. The rest of the flows had no payload (scan-
ning, incomplete, etc.).
Each flow carried one or more e-mails and we have
classified each e-mail as accepted or rejected by the mail
server or incomplete. Accepted e-mails (e-mails that are
delivered by the receiving mail server) contain the ba-
sic SMTP commands (“MAIL FROM”, “RCPT TO”
and “DATA”), e-mail headers, e-mail body, and a line
containing only a “.” (period or full stop), which indi-
cates the end of the e-mail data [30]. Rejected e-mails
are those that cannot succeed to finish the SMTP com-
mand exchange phase and do not send any e-mail data.
The rejection is generally due to the pre-filtering pro-
cess deployed by receiving mail servers. Studies from in-
side a well-known spamming botnet [31, 32] have shown
that the delivery success rate of spam is very low [31],
and these unsuccessful attempts should therefore be
considered as spam. Finally, incomplete SMTP flows
are mainly due to scanning attempts and measurement
equipment errors.
Furthermore, each accepted e-mail was classified as
spam or ham to provide the ground-truth for further in-
vestigations on differences in their characteristics. Sim-
ilar to [2, 33, 34], the classification was done by a well-
trained SpamAssassin [16] filtering tool. After that, all
the e-mail addresses were anonymized and e-mail con-
tents were discarded in order to preserve privacy.
We have extracted e-mail addresses of the senders and
the receivers from SMTP commands “MAIL FROM”
and “RCPT TO”, respectively. Each e-mail can have
one sender and one or more receiver. E-mails with
no senders (MAIL FROM:<>), which are mainly e-
mails that are sent to notify about delivery failures,
e-mails that have been rejected before sending these
SMTP commands, and encrypted communications were
ignored.
Each of the resulting e-mail networks were studied
as both undirected and directed graphs G(V,E), where
each vertex v ∈ V corresponds to an e-mail address and
each edge e ∈ E corresponds to an e-mail transmission
(from the sender to the receiver in the directed graph).
We have studied the graphs generated for the data
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Table 1: Summary of datasets of related works
Reference |V | |E| Type Dataset
Ebel et al. [1]
(2002)
59,812 86,130 undirected/
directed
log files of the e-mail server at
Kiel University
Gomes et al. [2]
(2005)
265,144 615,102 directed log files of the e-mail servers of
a department in a university in
Brazil
Newman et al. [23]
(2002)
16,881 57,029 directed address books on a university
computer system server
Boykin et al. [5]
(2005)
- - undirected headers of e-mail messages in one
user’s inbox
Lam et al. [26]
(2007)
9,150 - directed Enron dataset∗∗ and simulated
spam accounts and e-mails
Brendel et al. [25]
(2008)
- 10,000 directed incoming e-mails to a faculty in
Gdansk University
Kong et al. [24]
(2006)
56,969 84,190 undirected SCC of the dataset used in Ebel
et al. [1]
Tseng et al. [27]
(2009)
637,064 2,865,633 directed e-mail server of the computer
center in National Taiwan Uni-
versity
Caldarelli et al. [6]
(2004)
113-516∗ 5,628-21,782∗ undirected five e-mail directories coming
from authors’ and colleagues’ ac-
counts
* minimum and maximum number of nodes/edges in 5 different networks
** http://www.isi.edu/adibi/Enron/Enron Dataset Report.pdf
Table 2: Daily and weekly e-mail network statistics
Day |V | |E| undirected |E| directed 〈k〉
1 1,688,020 2,239,560 2,241,384 2.65
2 1,419,253 1,823,910 1,825,486 2.57
3 1,332,001 1,803,693 1,805,377 2.71
4 1,256,242 1606318 1,607,891 2.56
5 1,128,340 1,202,960 1,203,961 2.13
6 995,150 1,085,001 1,085,341 2.18
7 1,286,645 1,865,930 1,866,645 2.90
Week 6,096,959 10,949,763 10,962,143 3.59
captured daily, and the graph generated from the whole
week’s traffic (weekly). Table 2 shows the statistical
properties of the undirected and directed e-mail net-
works generated in each day and after the whole week.
Mean node degree is defined as 〈k〉 =
∑
v∈V d(v)/ |V |,
where d(v) denotes the degree of node v. The directed
e-mail network constructed after the seven days con-
sists of |V | = 6, 096, 959 nodes and |E| = 10, 949, 763
directed edges with a mean degree 〈k〉 = 3.59. This e-
mail network is much larger than the networks studied
previously [1, 2, 23, 6].
In order to study the distinguishing properties of ham
and spam e-mails, we have also generated two e-mail
networks, one containing only legitimate e-mails as edges
and another with spam e-mails as edges (according to
the classification done by SpamAssassin). A third e-
mail network was created from both delivered and re-
jected spam e-mail traffic. Due to existence of alterna-
tive links, only a small fraction of the captured SMTP
flows are symmetric (both e-mail transmission and e-
mail server responses are available), so it is not possible
for us to verify the rejection reason for all e-mail com-
munications. On the other hand, the error codes used in
SMTP replies when rejecting a communication are not
always informative of the rejection reason. However,
previous studies (e.g., [21]) have shown that rejections
are mainly because of spam pre-filtering strategies de-
ployed by e-mail servers including blacklisting, greylist-
ing, DNS lookups, and user database checks.
In general, the dataset used in this paper has the
following characteristics:
• The e-mail traffic was captured on an Internet
backbone link in both directions.
• The dataset does not contain internal e-mail com-
munications (between internal users with each other)
and is based on what can be seen on the backbone
link (different from previously studied datasets [1,
2]).
• Multiple e-mail transmissions between two e-mail
addresses are considered as one link for our anal-
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ysis, so the generated graph does not contain du-
plicate edges (similar to [13]).
• An edge in the ham/spam/rejected network exists
if a legitimate/spam/rejected e-mail was transmit-
ted between the vertices connected by that edge
(different than [2], which classified nodes as spam-
mer or non-spammer to generate the networks).
• Self-loops exist in the graph representing e-mails
sent by a user to herself.
Table 3: Daily and weekly ham network statistics
Day |V | |E| 〈k〉
1 146,914 120,016 1.63
2 164,747 145,538 1.77
3 132,496 110,836 1.67
4 125,327 104,062 1.66
5 106,470 86,731 1.63
6 57,862 46,672 1.61
7 73,037 54,136 1.48
Week 509,728 569,126 2.23
Table 4: Daily and weekly spam network statistics
Day |V | |E| 〈k〉
1 219,084 252,044 2.30
2 221,943 223,041 2.01
3 196,229 207,895 2.12
4 171,555 180,113 2.10
5 189,105 186,920 1.98
6 196,132 187,620 1.91
7 188,308 190,728 2.03
Week 1,040,051 1,346,397 2.59
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Figure 1: Growth of number of vertices and edges in
spam and ham networks after 1 day, 4 days, and the
complete week
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the statistics for ham and
spam networks, respectively. As can be seen, the spam
networks generated (both for each separate day and af-
ter the whole week) are larger than the respective ham
networks in terms of number of nodes and edges. Fig-
ure 1 shows the evolution of the spam and ham e-mail
networks as the number of nodes and edges grow from
the first day until the 7th day. As can be seen the
growth is almost linear for spam network but not for
the ham network. The mean degree for spam networks
in each day is also greater than the respective ham net-
work. Note that the spam network only contains the
accepted spam e-mails that managed to pass the pre-
filtering phase of the receiving mail server.
4. ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROPERTIES OF
THE E-MAIL NETWORKS
In this section we discuss our analysis of the various
structural and temporal properties of e-mail networks.
First, the topology of e-mail networks is studied as
undirected graphs focusing only on the existence of an
e-mail communication between two e-mail addresses.
Then the networks are analyzed as directed graphs tak-
ing into account the direction of each e-mail transmis-
sion. We have investigated the social properties of e-
mail networks for the graphs generated both on a day-
by-day basis during the course of a week (daily net-
works), and for the accumulated networks generated
after the whole week (weekly networks).
We have looked into the robust measures of network
topology that are widely used in order to understand
the topology and the structure of different types of net-
works [8]. Social networks are small world networks
with a relatively short path between any two vertices
and they are highly clustered. Social networks are also
scale-free networks since their degree distribution fol-
lows a power-law distribution [1]. Existence of a giant
strongly connected component is also another structural
property of social networks. In this section we have ana-
lyzed these characteristics and their temporal evolution
for complete e-mail networks as well as ham and spam
networks.
4.1 Average Path Length
The “small world phenomenon” often referred to as
“six degree of separation” was first studied in pioneering
work of Stanley Milgram in 1967. A network exhibits
the “small world phenomenon” if any two vertices in the
network are likely to be connected through a short se-
quence of intermediate vertices [35]. In social networks,
shortest path length l counts the number of acquain-
tances in the shortest chain connecting two people [9].
Online social networks [14], www [10, 11, 12], e-mail
networks [1], etc. are shown to be small world networks.
In this section, we have calculated the average of l
over all pairs of vertices in our ham and spam e-mail
networks. We have treated all edges as undirected and
5
have calculate shortest paths only in the giant strongly
connected component of the networks which contain a
large fraction of vertices of the network where a path
exists between any pair of them [9].
Table 5, shows the average shortest path length for
daily and weekly ham and spam networks. As can
be seen, the ham network usually has smaller average
shortest path except for day 7. In day 7 which was a
Sunday the number of nodes in the giant strongly con-
nected component of ham network was significantly less
than other days. The value of 〈l〉 depends on the num-
ber of nodes in a network [8]. Although the number of
nodes in the connected components of ham and spam
networks are different (see section 4.4), but it is clear
that they are both small world networks.
Table 5: Comparison of average shortest path lenghts
in daily ham and spam networks
Day 〈lham〉 〈lspam〉
1 10.10 11.82
2 8.05 11.09
3 9.34 10.46
4 9.05 9.37
5 8.26 10.61
6 5.33 11.76
7 13.69 12.42
Week 7.70 9.09
4.2 Clustering Coefficient
Watts and Strogatz [9] showed that in addition to
a short average path length, small world networks are
highly clustered. The existence of short average path
lengths between nodes in a small world network is not
specific to social networks, even random networks ex-
hibit the same property. But in social networks, the
network is fragmented into clusters of individuals with
similar characteristics, leading to a relatively high clus-
tering coefficient. The clustering coefficient Cv of a ver-
tex v is given by
Cv =
2Ev
kv(kv − 1)
where, kv is the number of neighbors of v, kv(kv −
1)/2 is the maximum number of edges that can exist
between the neighbors of v, and Ev is the number of
the edges that actually exist (the number of triangles
in the network structure).
The clustering coefficient of the network can be cal-
culated by averaging Cv for all nodes in the network.
C =
1
|V |
∑
v∈G
Cv
Table 6: Comparison of clustering coefficient in daily
and weekly e-mail and the respective random networks
Day C × 10−3 Crand × 10
−6
1 1.56 1.60
2 1.45 0.76
3 1.56 1.90
4 1.48 1.16
5 0.99 2.88
6 0.74 1.44
7 0.75 3.80
Week 1.68 0.33
Table 7: Comparison of clustering coefficient in daily
and weekly ham and the respective spam networks
Day Cham × 10
−3 Cspam × 10
−3
1 8.40 0.92
2 7.49 0.66
3 9.99 0.83
4 9.33 0.80
5 7.31 0.37
6 5.66 0.39
7 9.53 0.44
Week 9.95 1.19
The average clustering coefficients for the undirected
daily and weekly e-mail networks are shown in Table 6.
It can be seen that the average clustering coefficient of
each e-mail network is significantly greater than that
of a random graph with the same number of vertices
and average number of edges per vertex. Note that al-
though we do not see all the communications among
internal nodes with each other or among external nodes
with each other, the clustering coefficient of our net-
works is still significantly greater than that of the ran-
dom graphs. So, as Ebel et al. [1] also observed in their
e-mail network which also did not contain the commu-
nication of external users with each other, “a high clus-
tering coefficient is a characteristic of e-mail networks”.
Since the clustering coefficient in a social network
shows to what extent friends of a person are also friends
with each other, it is expected that the ham network
should have a greater clustering coefficient compared to
the spam network [5, 2]. The observed average clus-
tering coefficient for the ham network after the whole
week is Cham = 9.95× 10
−3 and for the spam network
that only includes delivered spam e-mails is Cspam =
1.19× 10−3. This value is even smaller for rejected and
delivered spam network Crejected+spam = 0.93 × 10
−3,
which confirms the unsocial behavior of spam traffic.
Table 7 shows that this difference between ham and
spam also holds for the daily networks.
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4.3 Degree Distribution
The most fundamental structural property of net-
works is their degree distribution, which is widely used
for modeling real networks. Degree distribution of a
network is the probability distribution of the node de-
grees over the whole network. It is a common property
of many real networks such as the Internet [17], the
World Wide Web[10, 12], phone call graphs [13], and
online social networks [14] to exhibit a power-law de-
gree distribution [15, 7].
In a power-law distribution, the degree of a node is
proportional to the fraction of nodes in the network
with degree k, n(k), to the power of a constant, γ,
n(k) ∝ k−γ
Networks exhibiting such degree distribution are called
scale-free [15, 17].
Ebel et al. showed in [1] that e-mail networks are
scale-free, since the degree of the nodes follows a power-
law distribution (n(k) ∝ k−1.81). The e-mail network
used by Ebel et al. was limited to log files of the mail
server of their university, and thus biased to local be-
havior. Our data, on the other hand, is not limited to
a local domain, and is orders of magnitude larger than
their data set, although it was collected during a shorter
period of time.
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Figure 2: Degree distribution of the complete weekly
e-mail network
Figure 2 shows the log-log plot of the degree distribu-
tion of the complete undirected weekly e-mail network.
The x-axis denotes the degree of a node, and the y-axis
denotes the fraction of nodes in the network with that
degree. As a surprise, it can be seen that the e-mail net-
work is not scale-free, since the degree distribution does
not follow a power-law distribution. This observation is
in contrast with previous works that observed scale-free
behavior on their datasets [1, 2, 5, 6]. Note that the
e-mail network studied here is significantly larger and
more complete than the previous studies.
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Figure 3: Degree distribution of undirected daily e-mail
networks
When looking at the degree distribution of the daily
e-mail networks (Figure 3) in the first four days and in
the seventh day, the deviation from power-law distribu-
tion is obvious. For the fifth and sixth days (which were
a Friday and a Saturday, respectively) the degree dis-
tribution is closer to a power-law distribution but still
does not follow the power-law in all points.
We suspect that this deviation from power-law dis-
tribution is caused by the large number of unsolicited
communications on the Internet. In order to verify this,
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Figure 5: Degree distribution of undirected weekly ham
network that exhibits a power-law distribution with es-
timated exponent γ = 2.4 (n(k) ∝ k−2.4)
we have generated a graph including only the legitimate
e-mail (ham) transmissions (according to scores gener-
ated by SpamAssassin). As shown in Figure 4, the ham
network is actually a scale-free network and its degree
distribution obeys a power law n(k) ∝ k−2.4 (Figure 5).
This means that the e-mail network of legitimate users
represents the same characteristics as other social net-
works.
It is known that the vast majority of spam e-mails are
automatically generated, so we expect that they don’t
show the same social behavior as human-generated e-
mail traffic. To investigate the difference, we have cre-
ated a network based on e-mail traffic that were either
spam or were rejected by the receiving mail servers (by
pre-filtering strategies such as blacklisting). Figure 6
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Figure 6: Degree distribution of weekly spam network
(including both delivered and rejected spam e-mails)
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Figure 7: Degree distribution of undirected weekly
spam network (including only delivered spam e-mails)
shows the vertex connectivity of this network. It can
be clearly observed that the delivered and rejected spam
e-mail network does not exhibit a power-law degree dis-
tribution.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to accurately sepa-
rate rejected e-mail traffic due to greylisting, tempo-
rary errors, and miss-configurations, from those that
are rejected due to IP blacklisting or other anti-spam
strategies (see section 3). In order to examine the so-
cial characteristics of spam more accurately, we have
constructed another e-mail network that only contains
delivered spam e-mails that successfully passed the pre-
filters (according to the SpamAssassin scores), and stud-
ied the degree distribution of this network. Figure 7
clearly indicates that the spam network does not show
scale-free behavior over a large range.
To further investigate the existence of a scale-free de-
8
100 101 102 103
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(a) Day 1
100 101 102 103 104
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(b) Day 2
100 101 102 103
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(c) Day 3
100 101 102 103
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(d) Day 4
100 101 102 103
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(e) Day 5
100 101 102 103 104 105
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(f) Day 6
100 101 102 103
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(g) Day 7
100 101 102 103 104
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
Degree
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Node Degree Distribution
 
 
Incoming
Outgoing
(h) One Week
Figure 8: In-degree (incoming) and out-degree (outgo-
ing) distribution of directed daily e-mail networks and
the complete weekly e-mail network
gree distribution, the e-mail network was examined as a
directed graph. Directed networks are characterized by
two degree distributions: the distribution of outgoing
edges which is the probability that a user have sent k
e-mails, and the distribution of incoming edges which is
the probability that k users have sent e-mail to a cer-
tain e-mail address. Figure 8 shows the daily as well
as the weekly in-degree and out-degree distributions.
In-degree of a node is the number of nodes it have re-
ceived e-mail from, and out-degree of a node denotes
the number of e-mails it has sent to others. Again, the
figures show that the degree distribution varies per day.
It can be seen that the distribution of out-degree devi-
ates much more from the power-law distribution com-
pared to the in-degree. In [1], the authors observed that
both the in-degree and out-degree of e-mail networks
follow the power-law distribution with different expo-
nents. However, the out-degree distribution for only
the internal users in their dataset was not showing a
scale-free behavior. This shows that the study of inter-
nal communications on its own is probably not enough
for observing the real structure of the networks.
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Figure 9: In-degree (incoming) and out-degree (outgo-
ing) distribution of weekly ham and spam networks
Plotting the in- and out-degree distribution for weekly
ham and spam in Figure 9 confirms that both the in-
and out-degree distributions for legitimate e-mail trans-
missions follow a power-law distribution (with different
exponents). Hence, ham network has scale free charac-
teristics of other social networks. The deviation from
power-law, especially observed in the out-degree dis-
tribution of spam network is caused by the non-social
behavior of spammers in automatically sending spam.
It is also interesting to see how these characteristics
evolve when aggregating data over a longer period of
time. Therefore, we have studied the changes in vertex
connectivity as the network grows over time. Again, we
have first studied e-mail networks as undirected graphs
and then as directed graphs. Figure 10 shows the tem-
poral evolution of degree distribution of the undirected
graph from the first day until the 7th day. It seems
that by accumulating more e-mail communications in
the network, the degree distribution gets closer to a
scale-free network. This also holds for the in-degree
distribution of the directed complete e-mail network
(Figure 11), but it is not the case for the out-degree
distribution.
The variation of the in- and out-degree distribution
for the ham network is shown in Figure 12. The in-
and out-degree distributions are quite similar for the
networks generated after 4 days and 7 days of mea-
surements. This also means that our short duration of
measurements (compared to Ebel et al. [1]) is not af-
fecting the existence of power-law degree distribution
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Figure 10: Temporal variation of node degree distribu-
tion of the undirected complete e-mail network
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Figure 11: Temporal variation of in-degree (incoming)
and out-degree (outgoing) distribution of directed com-
plete e-mail network
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Figure 12: Temporal variation is in-degree (incoming)
and out-degree (outgoing) distribution of directed ham
network
and the value of its exponent. This is not the case for
the spam network (Figure 13) which confirms that le-
gitimate traffic is similar to other social networks, but
spam is different since it is not social.
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Figure 13: Temporal variation is in-degree (incoming)
and out-degree (outgoing) distribution of directed spam
network
4.4 Strongly Connected Components
Another important structural property of complex
networks, including social networks, which is also used
for generating realistic network models is the presence
of a giant strongly connected component [13, 1]. A
strongly connected component (SCC) is a subset of ver-
tices of a network that can both reach and be reached
from any other vertex in the same set. A giant SCC
(GSCC) contains a significant fraction of the vertices in
the network.
This property was mainly studied in the literature to
investigate the spread of infections such as the propaga-
tion of e-mail-attached viruses that can forward them-
selves to e-mail addresses of users’ address books [1, 23].
This property was also used in analyzing modeling of
real networks such as the web graph [12], online social
networks [14] and the phone call graphs [13].
Table 8: Percentage of total number of nodes in the
GSCC of undirected daily and weekly e-mail, ham and
spam networks
Day E-mail Ham Spam
1 64.98% 29.84% 50.06%
2 65.01% 49.67% 27.75%
3 66.17% 33.00% 35.00%
4 62.77% 34.92% 43.13%
5 41.81% 32.97% 29.99%
6 41.84% 31.69% 24.56%
7 66.17% 10.78% 30.61%
Week 81.08% 68.60% 51.14%
The undirected weekly e-mail network studied in this
paper is comprised from 326,473 separate strongly con-
nected components with a GSCC containing 4,943,470
nodes which is 81.08% of the total number of nodes
in the network. The second largest SCC of this e-mail
network contains only 766 nodes which is approximately
6, 400 times smaller than the GSCC. For each individual
10
day, the e-mail networks also have a GSCC with differ-
ent fraction of nodes ranging from 41% to 66% of the
total number of nodes in the network. All the weekly
and daily ham and spam networks also have a number
of disjoint components with a giant strongly connected
component. The GSCC of the weekly ham network con-
tains 68% and the GSCC of the spam network contains
51% of the total number of nodes in the respective net-
work. The daily ham and spam networks have smaller
percentage of nodes in their GSCCs tahn the weekly
networks as can be seen in Table 8. Considering all the
rejected and delivered spam traffic together, the GSCC
of the undirected weekly network contains 4, 642, 015
nodes which is 80.44% of the total number of nodes in
its network. Note that the components with SCC of
size 1, show the self-loops in the graph that are e-mails
sent from one person to herself.
The distribution of the size of the SCCs for the undi-
rected weekly e-mail network is shown in Figure 14. The
x-axis denotes the size of each SCC of the network, and
the y-axis denotes the fraction of nodes in that SCC.
Both axes are plotted in logarithmic scale. It can be
seen that the GSCC of the network is orders of magni-
tude larger than other strongly connected components
of the network.
Figure 15 illustrates that a GSCC similarly exists
in the weekly ham, spam, and rejected plus delivered
spam networks. However, the shapes of the distribu-
tions are not similar. The distribution for the ham net-
work follows a power-law distribution, but the shape
of the distribution for the spam network and the re-
jected plus delivered spam network are slightly differ-
ent and some outliers are present in the distributions.
Therefore, the distribution of the size of SCCs of the
complete e-mail network does not follow the power-law
distribution (Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Distribution of the size of strongly connected
components for the undirected weekly e-mail network
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Figure 15: Distribution of the size of strongly connected
components for the undirected weekly ham, spam and
rejected plus delivered spam e-mail networks
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Figure 16: Distribution of the size of strongly connected
components for the directed weekly e-mail network
The directed weekly e-mail network studied here con-
tains 580,112 separated connected components and its
largest SCC contains only 41,593 vertices, which is around
0.68% of the total number of nodes in the network, i.e.
it is not a GSCC. Figure 16 demonstrates the SCC dis-
tribution for the directed weekly e-mail network in log-
arithmic scale. The x-axis denotes the size of each SCC
of the network, and the y-axis shows the fraction of
nodes in that SCC.
The largest SCC of the ham network contains 3.28%
of the total number of nodes in the graph which is not
a large fraction of nodes. However, this value is still
much larger than the largest SCC of the spam network
which contains only 0.74%, and the largest SCC of the
rejected and delivered spam network that includes only
0.14% of the nodes in the network. Figure 17 illustrates
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Figure 17: Distribution of the size of SCCs for the di-
rected ham, spam, and rejected plus delivered spam net-
works generated after the whole week
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Figure 18: Temporal variation in the distribution of the
size of SCCs for the undirected e-mail network gener-
ated after 1 day, 4 days, and the complete week
that a GSCC does not exist in the directed spam, and
the rejected plus delivered spam networks.
The small size of the largest SCC of the studied net-
works compared to the previous studies that examined
phone call graphs [13] and the web [12] (bothe of them
have a GSCC containing around 28% of the total num-
ber of nodes in their respective directed networks) can
be due to measurement shortcomings. For example,
due to routing policies we see less traffic on the outgo-
ing direction compared to the incoming direction of the
measured backbone link.
Figure 17 also shows that the rejected spam network
have a different distribution shape for the size of its
SCCs compared to the ham network. This deviation
which similarly exists in the undirected network is in
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Figure 19: Temporal variation in the distribution of the
size of SCCs for the directed e-mail network generated
after 1 day, 4 days, and the complete week
contrast with the SCC size distribution of the web graph
[12] and phone call graphs [13] and the ham network
where the distributions were obeying the power-law dis-
tribution.
The temporal variation in the distribution of size of
SSCs in Figure 19 and Figure 18 shows that by increas-
ing the number of nodes in the network, the size and the
number of the connected components increases in both
directed and undirected e-mail networks. In the undi-
rected network, the GSCC size increases from 64.98% in
the first day to 81.01% after 4 days and reaches 81.08%
after the whole week. For the ham network, the size
of the GSCC also increases from 29.84% to 64.50% and
reaches 68.6% after the whole week. However, the size
of the GSCC of the spam network seems to be little
changing from 50.06% to 52.31% and 51.14%.
According to our findings, by increasing the size of
the network, the deviation of the distribution of the size
of SCCs of the networks from the respective power-law
distribution becomes clearer, especially for the directed
networks case.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section the observed structural and temporal
characteristics of the e-mail networks examined in this
paper are discussed.
The e-mail networks studied in this paper were gen-
erated from SMTP traffic captured on an Internet back-
bone link. The traffic we have captured contains a good
mix of traffic from several universities, student dormito-
ries, corporate users, and home users and thus is more
complete compared to previous attempts to study the
topology and structure of e-mail networks [1, 23, 2, 6].
We have observed that e-mail networks are “small
12
world” networks with short average path lengths and
high clustering coefficients. Our results indicate that
the clustering coefficient is a discriminative character-
istic for ham and spam networks. Networks of legit-
imate e-mails have higher clustering coefficient values
confirming the results in [5]. So this property can be
deployed in different anti-spam tools. Average short-
est path length can also be used to distinguish ham
from spam traffic, but its calculation is computation-
ally prohibitive (depends on the number of nodes in the
network (O(log n3))) and thus not reasonable for large
scale networks.
We have also shown that despite the common belief
that e-mail networks are scale-free [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 5], the
e-mail network generated from real network traffic is not
scale-free. We have shown that only legitimate e-mail
traffic exhibit scale-free behavior, and the deviation of
the degree distribution from power-law distribution is
mainly caused by spam traffic, especially spam e-mails
sent by known spammers that were rejected during the
pre-filtering process by the receiving mail servers. We
conjecture that Ebel et al. [1] did not observe this in
their e-mail network because their data was more lo-
cal with fewer spammers or the log files only contained
delivered e-mails. Gomes et al. [2] also studied the
e-mail transmissions limited to one university depart-
ment, and although their data contained rejected and
spam traffic they did not observe non-power-law behav-
ior in the degree distributions. We think it can be due
to the method they used to generate their e-mail net-
works by classifying e-mail addresses as spammer and
non-spammer. Boykin et al. [5] also observed that spam
e-mail has a power-law distribution but with an expo-
nent greater than that of legitimate e-mails. However,
their e-mail network was limited to e-mail communica-
tions of a single user.
We have also observed that the in- and out-degree dis-
tributions are different when looking into directed daily
and weekly e-mail networks. The out-degree clearly
does not follow a power-law distribution. This is due to
the non-social behavior of spammers in automatically
sending large amount of spam.
With time as the networks grow larger and more con-
nected, it is expected that the degree distribution will
get closer to a power-law distribution, even for spam
networks. Therefore, it turns out that it is not neces-
sary to collect data for long periods of time to be able to
detect the existence of spammers in a network. In other
words, if we want to take advantage of this distinguish-
ing difference between ham and spam, we should con-
struct e-mail networks with a shorter time window. In
addition, by creating the network from a shorter period
of time the number of nodes and edges in the network
would be smaller and the analysis of the data becomes
easy and fast.
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Figure 20: Comparison of degree distribution for com-
plete undirected e-mail network and ham network gen-
erated from 12-hour measurement
The selection of the size of the time window can de-
pend on the network being measured. During the day-
time and working hours more ham is exchanged, al-
though spam activity stays almost constant during the
24 hours [19]. All these factors could be taken into ac-
count when selecting a time interval for capturing the
traffic and generating the e-mail networks.
In order to verify that the study of degree distribu-
tion is still useful with shorter time windows, we have
generated an e-mail network from e-mail traffic cap-
tured in a 12-hour window on Wednesday (day 3) from
6 am to 6 pm (working hours). The generated net-
work has 926, 845 vertices and 1, 229, 718 edges, and as
Figure 20 shows, the degree distribution for the whole
e-mail network clearly deviates from a power-law distri-
bution. However as the figure shows, the ham network
generated from this dataset still shows a scale free be-
havior. Therefore, it seems that for our dataset even
a 12-hour time window (as an alternative to 24 hours
or a complete week) during working days could clearly
identify the existence of spamming activities.
Finally, we have shown that a giant strongly con-
nected component (GSCC), which usually exists in so-
cial networks, is similarly present in both the undirected
spam and ham networks. However, the shape of the
distribution of the size of SCCs differs for ham and
spam, especially when rejected traffic is also considered
as spam. This distribution for the ham network obeys
a power-law distribution, but this is not the case for
the rejected and the spam traffic. Also as the networks
evolve over time, the ham network becomes more con-
nected but the percentage of nodes in the GSCC of the
spam network changes a little.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In order to better understand the social behavior and
dynamics of e-mail users, we have performed a study of
the structural properties of e-mail networks. Under-
standing the topology of e-mail networks and funda-
mental social properties of e-mail traffic can lead to a
better insight into the e-mail communication of legiti-
mate users and new ways to detect spamming activities
on the Internet.
Our analysis on the e-mail network generated from
SMTP traffic on an Internet backbone link revealed that
contrary to previous studies, which were based on very
limited datasets, connectivity of nodes in e-mail net-
works does not show a power-law behavior. This devia-
tion from scale-free characteristic found in other social
networks is caused by the extensive number of spam
present on the Internet.
Our study of the social network dynamics and charac-
teristics of spam and legitimate e-mail traffic indicates
that there are similarities and differences. The most
significant difference is that legitimate e-mail traffic is
social while non-legitimate traffic such as spam does
not show social behavior. The differences revealed in
this study could potentially be used to compliment cur-
rent anti-spam tools and lead to new methods to detect
spamming nodes on network-level closer to the source.
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